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I. INTRODUCTION*
Municipal zoning ordinances are often used to exclude from a com-
munity persons of a lower socio-economic status than the existing resi-
dents. Such practices, known collectively as exclusionary zoning, have
come under increasing attack as the shortage of decent housing, in the
United States becomes more severe. 2
The overcrowding of urban core areas has accelerated the "white flight"
from major cities. Most persons who have abandoned the center city and
* The student contributors are Denise M. Darby, Gary R. Griffith and Virginia Szigeti.
1. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No.
34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1968) [hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS COMM'N]; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME (1968) [hereinafter cited as KAISER COMM'NI; NATIONAl.
ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT (1968) [hereinafter cited as KERNER REPORT!.
2. It has been estimated that in 1960 some nine million persons occupied substandard
housing units in the United States. It was further found that 30% of all non-white households
and 10% of all white households were overcrowded and that 58% of these overcrowded house-
holds were located in metropolitan areas. KAISER COMM'N, supra note 1, at 44. The Douglas
Commission recommended that between 2.0 and 2.25 million new housing units be con-
structed to cope with the need for adequate housing and that a large portion of these new
housing starts be reserved for persons of lower income. DOUGLAS COMM'N, supra note 1, at 11.
646
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
established residence in suburban areas have been white and more affluent
than the urban dwellers. The result has been creation of two economically
and racially disparate societies.3 In addition, it has been estimated that
within a recent seven-year period, over half of all industrial and commer-
cial buildings were constructed outside the core cities of metropolitan
areas.' With more job sources and vacant land being found in the suburbs,5
it was inevitable that a subsequent movement of the less affluent urban
dwellers would also occur. However, a major obstacle to the relocation of
these lower- and moderate-income families in suburban areas has been the
prevalence of exclusionary zoning techniques. The fundamental exclusion-
ary devices are restrictions upon lot size, building size, multifamily dwell-
ing construction, and "single family" residency requirements.
Zoning ordinances which restrict the minimum size of a building lot" are
the most common means7 by which municipalities'attempt to control pop-
ulation density.' Generally, since single family home owners control a sub-
urb's zoning decisions,' the resulting zoning scheme encourages low popu-
lation density. By so restricting the amount of land available for develop-
3. In 1966, the population of metropolitan areas outside the center city was 96% white.
KERNER REPORT, supra note 1, at 118-21. It is predicted that by 1984, thirteen major United
States cities will have total populations of which blacks comprise more than 50%. Id. at 216.
4. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR, REP. No. 303, CHANGES IN URBAN
AMERICA 5 (1969). With this amount of construction in the suburbs it is logical that, from
1960-67, 50% of all new jobs were created in suburban areas. Id. at 1-5.
5. One article reports a study which found that 99% of the vacant land in the twenty most
populous urban areas is located outside the center cities. Snob Zoning, THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Dec. 20, 1969, at 7.
6. One commentator refers to minimum lot size requirements as "snob zoning" due to their
exclusionary effect on low- and moderate-income housing. Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's
Home Be a Castle?, 69 MICH. L. REv. 339, 340 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Snob Zoningl.
7. 2 N. WILLIAMS, JR., AIERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 38.01 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 2
N. WILLIAMIS].
8. See generally 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, §§ 38.04-.10, 65.01. An objective of minimum
lot size requirements, in addition to density control, is the preservation of a rural or semi-
rural atmosphere with its attendant peace and quiet, open space, light and air, and reduced
traffic congestion. See Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280,
284 (Sup. Ct. 1950); cf. Bogert v. Township of Washington, 25 N.J. 57, 135 A.2d 1, 5, aff g 45
N.J. Super. 13, 131 A.2d 535 (App. Div. 1957); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560,
42 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1942).
Other objectives are to reduce the demand on public facilities and maintain property
values, while lowering the tax rate. See 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 8.47 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as 2 R. ANDERSON]; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 38.16; Note, Large Lot
Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418, 1421-24 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Large Lot Zoningl. The level
of property tax rates is a proper concern of the community. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11,283 A.2d 353, 357 (App. Div. 1971); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.1-489(7) (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1975).
9. See Large Lot Zoning, supra note 8, at 1420-21.
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ment within the zoning district,10 the effect is to increase the price of that
land. As a consequence, low- and moderate-income persons are excluded
because of this higher price" and because of the lack of land available for
smaller lots and multifamily units.2
Zoning ordinances which establish minimum cost requirements for
dwellings have generally been held unconstitutional. 3 However, in order
to circumvent this result, many municipalities have resorted to minimum
building size restrictions. 4 A number of courts, in upholding such regula-
tions, have reasoned that some minimum restrictions are necessary to
avoid the detrimental effects of overcrowding upon the physical and men-
tal well-being of the dwelling's occupants.' 5 It has not been shown, how-
ever, that minimum lot size restrictions do, in fact, control population
density.'"
One of the most controversial methods of maintaining low population
density has been the use of restrictions on multifamily dwellings. 7 Some
municipalities attempt to prohibit construction of all such housing within
their borders; 8 others impose severe restrictions upon such units. 9 The
10. See 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 38.21 at 40.
11. See Snob Zoning, supra note 6, at 341.
12. Id.
13. See Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARv. L.
REV. 1051, 1055 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Zoning for Minimum Standards].
14. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486(b) (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended (Cum. Supp.
1975). The primary purposes of these regulations are the protection of public health, mainte-
nance of the community's tax base, and protection of property values. 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra
note 7, § 63.01.
15. See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693, 697
(1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953). See also Nolan & Horack, How Small a
House?-Zoning for Minimum Space Requirements, 67 HARV. L. REV. 967 (1954).
16. Haar, Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. REV. 986
(1954); Zoning for Minimum Standards, supra note 13, at 1061; 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7,
§ 63.06.
17. See generally Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Controls: The Case of
North-Eastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 475 (1971); Note, Lout Income Housing in
the Suburbs: The Problem of Exclusionary Zoning, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 58 (1971); Comment,
Suburban Apartment Zoning: Legality and Technique, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 955
(1971); 23 ALA. L. REV. 157 (1970); Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of
Joseph Girsh, 74 DICK. L. REV. 634 (1970); Symposium: Apartments in Suburbia: Local
Responsibility and Judicial Restraint, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 344 (1964); Babcock & Bosselman,
Snob Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1040 (1963).
18. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
19. One of the most common practices is to restrict the number of bedrooms permitted in
a multifamily dwelling. See, e.g., Molino v. Borough of Glassboro, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281
A.2d 401, 405-06 (L. Div. 1971). Such ordinances discourage the influx of lower-income fami-
[Vol. 10:646
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result, however, is the same: construction of certain types of housing,
which could be afforded by lower-income families, is either prohibited or
inhibited. 0
An equally exclusionary result is reached by ordinances controlling the
number of unrelated occupants within a dwelling. This practice is referred
to as "single family" zoning.2' These ordinances ordinarily limit a "family"
to those persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption.2 In Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas,2 the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a local
ordinance which defined "family" in a similarly restrictive manner.24 The
Court deferred to the locality's judgment in this area of social legislation,2
and left municipalities in a strong position to defend not only "single
family" restrictions but also most other exclusionary zoning ordinances
mentioned herein. This note will explore possible substantive and proce-
dural challenges to such ordinances.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO EXCLUSIONARY
ZONING
A. TRADITIONAL SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The power of a government to restrict the use and enjoyment of real
property through zoning measures has long been considered a valid exer-
cise of the police power.2" Zoning of land involves the exercise of judgment
lies with children. 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 56.01 at 441.
The New Jersey Supreme Court seems to recognize "a right to be [free from] . . . a
limitation on the number of members in [a] family in order to reside any place." Molino v.
Borough of Glassboro, supra at 405-06; accord, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (L. Div. 1971). But see Malmar Associates v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 260 Md. 292, 272 A.2d 6, 16 (1971).
20. See generally Watson, Where Will the Low-Income Families Live?, 3 REAL ESTATE L.J.
37 (1974); Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents, 23
STAN. L. REV. 774 (1971); Note, The Use of Zoning Laws to Prevent Poor People from Moving
Into Suburbia, 16 How. L.J. 351 (1971); Cutler, Legality of Zoning to Exclude the Poor: A
Preliminary Analysis of Evolving Law, 37 BROOK. L. REV. 483 (1971); Aloi, Goldberg & White,
Racial and Economic Segregation by Zoning: Death Knell for Home Rule?, 1 ToL. L. REV.
65 (1969).
21. 2 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, § 52.02 at 350-51.
22. See City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 34 N.Y.2d 300, 313 N.E.2d 756, 357 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1974); Marino v. Mayor & Council, 77 N.J. Super. 587, 187 A.2d 217 (L. Div. 1963); City
of Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (L. Div. 1961).
23. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In Euclid, the Court upheld
the validity of a comprehensive zoning ordinance on the grounds that it was a valid exercise
of the state's police power, asserted for the public welfare. The Court applied the traditional
19761
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which has been held to be legislative in character 7 subject to judicial
invalidation only if arbitrary and capricious and having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, or welfare.2 The source of this re-
straint on the zoning power is the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution.29 Challenges to zoning ordinances based
on the due process clause have met with only limited success since the
locality's exercise of the police power will be upheld if it is shown to be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a public purpose.30
Usually, where there is room for difference of opinion or if the
reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is fairly debatable, the courts will not
disturb it.3 Where a zoning ordinance is held to be a proper exercise of the
police power, the right of the property owner to the unrestricted use of his
land is subordinated to the exercise of such power. Therefore, if the tradi-
tional due process test is applied in cases challenging the exclusionary
effects of zoning ordinances, most ordinances will remain intact.
B. EQUAL PROTEcrION
The central legal argument against exclusionary zoning is that such
zoning violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2
Under the traditional two-tier approach3 in equal protection analysis, liti-
due process test in declaring the ordinance valid: zoning ordinances will be upheld unless they
bear no substantial relation to the public health, safety, or welfare.
27. See, e.g., Higginbothan v. Barrett, 473 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1973); Barton v. Atkin-
son, 228 Ga. 733, 187 S.E.2d 835, 843-44 (1972); O'Rourke v. City of Tulsa, 457 P.2d 782, 783-
85 (Okla. 1969). But see Wasicki v. Zoning Bd., 163 Conn. 166, 302 A.2d 276, 278-79 (1972);
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327, 330-31 (1972); Donovan v. Clarke,
22 F. Supp. 632, 634 (D.D.C. 1963).
28. Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 120-21 (1928);
Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608
(1927).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads in part: "[Nlor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. "
30. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894). See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962); People v. Hawley, 207 Cal. 395, 279 P. 136, 143-44 (1929).
31. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works,
274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395-96 (1926);
Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294, 296 (1924).
32. See generally Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Exclusionary Zoning]; Note, The Constitutionality of Local
Zoning, 79 YAI L.J. 896 (1970); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rsv. 767 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Tight Little
Islands].
33. For a discussion of the two-tier approach, see Yackle, Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr.
Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9 U. RIcH.
L. REv. 181, 187-91 (1975).
[Vol. 10:646
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gants attempt to trigger "strict judicial scrutiny" of challenged ordinances
rather than the more permissive "minimum rationality" standard." Where
the ordinance peculiarly affects a suspect class 5 or a fundamental right,36
the equal protection clause casts a heavy burden upon the local govern-
ment to show (1) that the law is necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest and (2) that there is no less drastic way to achieve
the governmental objective.37 Plaintiffs are likely to prevail when challeng-
ing exclusionary zoning if they convince the court to adopt this strict
standard of review. A zoning regulation which excludes a person from a
particular area solely upon the basis of race denieshim rights guaranteed
by the equal protection clause.3" Also invalid are zoning ordinances which
more subtly establish racial classifications.39 The effect of either form of
34. With respect to legislative classifications reviewed under the "minimum rationality"
test, the Court has stated that "the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." F.S. Roys-
ter Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). In another case, Chief Justice Warren
stated an even more permissive standard to govern minimum rationality analysis:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective . ..[A] statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
35. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (racial minority).
36. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote).
37. This concept is "strict judicial scrutiny". A number of cases have established suspect
classifications. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (nationality).
The Supreme Court has recognized fundamental rights in certain cases: Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973) (right to privacy); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (right to vote);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (right to adequate appellate review of a criminal conviction); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to marry and procreate).
38. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
39. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In Yick Wo, the Court declared
that a municipal ordinance regulating lawful business activities within a municipality's
boundaries violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment if, in the ad-
ministration of that ordinance, the municipality made arbitrary and unjust discriminations
founded upon differences in race. Id. at 374. Accord, Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975). In
this recent case, plaintiffs alleged that Arlington Heights' refusal to rezone a parcel of land
in a manner which would permit the construction of a low- and moderate-income housing
development violated their constitutional rights under the equal protection clause. Plaintiffs
argued that refusal to rezone the land had a racially discriminatory effect and perpetuated
Arlington Heights' segregated community character. The court of appeals stated that
"[riegardless of the Village Board's motivation, if this alleged discriminatory effect exists,
the decision violates the Equal Protection Clause unless the Village can justify it by showing
a compelling interest." Id. at 413. The court pointed out that in 1970 Arlington Heights'
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zoning ordinance is to exclude an insular minority from a particular area,
thus triggering strict scrutiny.
Exclusionary ordinances have been unsuccessfully attacked on the
ground that they operate more harshly upon the low-income classes thus
establishing a wealth-related classification." The Supreme Court disa-
greed, holding that legislative classifications affecting only the poor are not
constitutionally suspect in and of themselves.'
population was 64,884 persons but that only 27 persons were black. Between 1960 and 1970,
in the northwestern portion of Cook County, where Arlington Heights is located, there was
an influx of 219,000 people, only 170 of whom were black. Id. at 413-14 nn.1 & 2. Based upon
these statistics and other findings of fact, the court found that "rejection of the ... proposal
has racially discriminatory effects." Id. at 414.
On April 20, 1976, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court has the power to
order the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to implement a remedial
housing plan in the suburbs surrounding the City of Chicago. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct.
1538 (1976). It is doubtful that the decision is indicative of a change in the Court's attitude
in federal intrusion into zoning matters. Gautreaux can be seen as the Court's belief that
"[o]nce a constitutional violation is found, a federal court is required to tailor 'the scope of
the remedy' to fit 'the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.' "Id. at 4483, quoting
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974). While in Gautreaux the Court found a constitu-
tional violation in HUD's violation of the fifth amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
it is unclear what, if any, violation it will find in Arlington Heights. Accordingly, the
Gautreaux holding, while important as a possible insight into the Court's viewing of the
problems of metropolitan growth, including education, should not influence the outcome of
Arlington Heights.
Following the inclusion of Arlington Heights in a footnote in Washington v. Davis, 44
U.S.L.W. 4789 (U.S. June 7, 1976), commentators have written that the Court has in fact
either decided or indicated its predisposition in Arlington Heights. In fact, Mr. Justice Ste-
vens wrote a separate concurring opinion because the Court "expresses an opinion on the
merits of the cases cited in n.12." Id. at 4801.
See also Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U-S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970);
Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th
Cir. 1970); Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. II1. 1971); Crow
v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
40. See generally Tight Little Islands, supra note 32; Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 32;
Note, Low Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1971);
Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning after Valtierra and Dandridge,
81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971); Comment, Zoning: Closing the Economic Gap, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 347
(1970).
41. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973), in which the Court
stated: "However, there is dicta in some Supreme Court cases suggesting that wealth-related
classifications require strict judicial scrutiny; however, these cases involve the abridgment
of fundamental rights and therefore strict judicial scrutiny is applied regardless of the wealth-
related classification." See also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400-01 (1971) (restraint upon
personal liberty); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (access to the judicial
system); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (right to vote);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668 (1966) (right to vote).
[Vol. 10:646
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Also unlikely to trigger a strict standard of review are enactments which
classify according to family size. In Dandridge v. Williams,42 a Maryland
welfare program was challenged in that it imposed a ceiling upon the
amount of assistance a family could receive under the federal Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.4 3 The plaintiffs argued
that this regulation violated the equal protection clause because it discrim-
inated against large families. In reversing a lower court decision," the
Supreme Court did not subject the legislation to strict scrutiny and upheld
the statute. 5 The Court's affirmance of a state's right to place ceilings on
the public's access to a limited source of funds supports analogous
arguments favoring exclusionary zoning to insure that public services are
provided for all residents. Municipal services are not limitless, and just as
most scarce resources they must be allocated to members of society in a
manner similar to welfare payments. It is arguable that exclusionary zon-
ing devices act as a "ceiling" upon the distribution of municipal services
and attempt to allocate these limited services in a way that serves the
members of a community most beneficially.
A theory often seen in zoning cases is that exclusionary zoning devices
require strict scrutiny because they affect a fundamental right to have
housing. The Supreme Court has recognized that equal access to housing
is a problem of constitutional stature." However, in Lindsay v. Normet,11
the Supreme Court rejected the argument that decent housing is itself a
fundamental right. A majority of the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny
to an Oregon unlawful detainer law and thereby foreclosed another means
of attacking exclusionary ordinances under the equal protectionclause.1s
C. THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Preceding portions of this note have stressed the extensive local
regulation of privately owned lands in the United States.49 Since land
42. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (1970), as amended. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-10 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
44. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1968).
45. The Court apparently accepted the defendants' argument that the law was rationally
supported and warranted by legitimate state interests, particularly because the law encour-
aged one to seek gainful employment. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1970).
46. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369 (1967); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). It must be recalled that each of these
cases involved racial issues as well as housing issues and thus differ from factual settings
involving housing issues only. But these decisions do indicate that the Court is aware of the
significance of adequate housing.
47. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
48. Id. at 70.
49. In a survey of 18,000 local government units, approximately 14,000 local governments
1976]
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regulations so often result in the exclusion of citizens from a particular
locality,50 a substantial restriction is imposed on population mobility. It is
this effect of exclusionary zoning which today furnishes the most signifi-
cant basis for constitutional challenge. It is argued that the right to travel
is a special right, engrained within the structure of American society such
that an abridgment of this right, under certain circumstances, will be
reviewed under an exacting judicial test. Although no specific constitu-
tional base has been agreed upon, a significant body of case law5' and
commentators suggest that the constitutional right to travel does exist.52
The first acknowledgement of the right appeared in Chief Justice Taney's
dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases,-3 but not until Edwards v.
California4 did the right to travel achieve great judicial importance.55 The
Supreme Court in Edwards reviewed a statute prohibiting non-resident
indigents from travelling into California and found it to be an unconstitu-
tional burden on interstate commerce.56 The holding in Edwards certainly
protects the right to travel, but the scope of that protection seems to
encompass interstate travel only. Because Congress possesses plenary
power over interstate commerce, one could argue that an individual's right
to travel interstate could be effectively controlled by federal regulations. 5
In 1966, the right to travel received additional constitutional recognition.
In United States v. Guest,5" six private individuals were indicted under the
employed some form of land use regulation. DOUGLAS COMM'N, supra note 1, at 208-10.
50. See Section I supra.
51. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285-87 (1970) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (one of the
privileges and immunities of national citizenship); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634,
638 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-91 (1965) (concurring opinion) (ninth
amendment right); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 505-07, 517 (1964), citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 127 (1958) (one of the
liberties protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment); Crandall v. Nevada,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868) (one of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship).
52. The "general unwritten premise" of the constitutional scheme is an additional basis
for the right to travel. See Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 IOWA L. REV. 6, 41-48 (1955);
Comment, The Right to Travel and its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws, 66 Nw. U.L.
REV. 635, 639 n.10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Right to Travel].
53. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 464 (1849) (dissenting opinion). A portion of his opinion reads:
For all the great purposes for which the federal government was formed, we are one
people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as
members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every
part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. . . . Id. at 492.
54. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
55. But see Crandell v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), quoting Passenger Cases, 48
U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (dissenting opinion).
56. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
57. Right to Travel, supra note 52, at 638-39 n.16.
58. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 for conspiring to deprive blacks of their constitu-
tional rights, one of which was the right to travel. In its opinion, the Court
did not base the right to travel upon any specific provision of the Constitu-
tion, but concluded that the right was secured by the Constitution in
general and protected from abridgment by private individuals as well as
by state and federal governments."
Perhaps the most important Supreme Court decision recognizing the
right to travel is Shapiro v. Thompson,' where the Court declared violative
of the equal protection clause Connecticut's one-year residency require-
ment for welfare aid. The Court began its analysis of the case by affirming
its holding in Guest that the right to travel was secured by the Constitution
in general, and reasoned that a statute "deterring the in-migration of
indigents" was constitutionally impermissible because it had a chilling
effect on travel. 2 On the basis that the right to travel was involved, the
Court invoked the strict scrutiny test 3 and invalidated the statute." It
should be noted, however, that before invoking this test the Court reviewed
the nature of the penalty imposed by the statute, emphasizing the indi-
gency of those whose mobility was restrained.65 One may therefore argue
that it was the denial of welfare payments to indigents which burdened
travel so seriously as to require strict scrutiny.66 Perhaps a less significant
penalty on the right to travel, which affects all classes of society, will
invoke a less stringent standard of review.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964), as amended (1968).
60. 383 U.S. at 757-60 & n.17.
61. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
62. Id. at 631.
63. It is submitted that the compelling state interest test is equivalent to and yields the
same results as the concept of "strict judicial scrutiny." See text accompanying note 34 supra.
64. The Court, in requiring a compelling state interest, suggested that "[e]ven under
traditional equal protection tests a classification of welfare applicants according to whether
they have lived in the State one year would seem to be irrational and unconstitutional." 394
U.S. at 638.
65. Id. at 629. The state statute denied poor immigrants welfare assistance for a year.
66. In support of this argument, it is important to note that the compelling interest analysis
advanced in Shapiro asks: (1) whether a regulation of travdl places a penalty on the right to
travel and, if it does, (2) whether the regulation promotes a compelling government interest.
Id. at 638 n.21 (1969).
67. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), where the Supreme Court upheld the validity
of an Iowa durational residency requirement for a divorce. The Court rejected appellant's
claim that the Iowa statute was unconstitutional because it established two classes of persons
and discriminated against those who had recently exercised their right to travel to Iowa. The
Court did not review this equal protection challenge using a stringent standard of review. The
Sosna holding supports the contention that if the penalty on the right to travel is not so severe
as to outweigh any benefits gained by the state because of the penalty, the right to travel
will not be afforded protection by strict scrutiny. Thus, the penalty analysis created in
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In the 1970's, the trend in the Supreme Court has been to limit the
situations in which strict scrutiny is applied." This position was recently
followed in a decision upholding a zoning ordinance which allegedly re-
stiicted the right to travel. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,69 the Su-
preme Court declared valid a zoning regulation limiting occupancy of sin-
gle family dwellings to no more than two unrelated persons.7" The plaintiffs
in Belle Terre alleged that this local ordinance violated their rights of
privacy, association, and travel and should be declared unconstitutional.
7 1
Rejecting this claim the Supreme Court applied the deferential review of
minimum rationality even though travel was involved. 72 The Court found
Shapiro becomes a balancing test, or sliding scale level of review when dealing with the right
to travel.
68. The trend has also been one avoiding the rigidities of the traditional "two-tier" ap-
proach in favor of a more flexible model of equal protection analysis. In 1965 one commentator
offered four components of such a model:
1) What is the character and importance of the interests which the state is attempt-
ing to protect or promote by the rule in question?
2) What is the character and importance of the interests adversely affected by this
rule?
3) How substantial is the connection between the particular basis of classification
represented by the rule in question and the legitimate purposels it is designed to
serve?
4) Are there available to the state alternative means of serving those purposes ade-
quately, without so adversely affecting the significant interests of those who are placed
at a disadvantage? Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRANSI-
TION Q. 28, 29 (1965).
This "balancing" process has been applied in some form in many recent Supreme Court
cases. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973)
(food stamp distribution); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (distributor of contra-
ceptives); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex discrimination). See also Yackle, Thoughts
on Rodriquez: Mr. Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection in the Supreme Court,
9 U. RICH. L. REV. 181 (1975).
69. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
70. This restriction did not apply to persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Id.
at 2.
71. The district court judge concluded that the exclusionary classification failed to promote
traditional zoning objectives (safety, preservation of land from excessive use, reduction of
traffic congestion, etc.) but that it did represent a lawful effort to maintain the traditional
family character of the community. Relief was therefore denied. Boraas v. Village of Belle
Terre, 367 F. Supp. 136, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
The court of appeals applied a more exacting test and held that the classification created
by the ordinance did not rationally promote valid zoning objectives. The court agreed with
the trial court that the ordinance did not promote traditional objectives but refused to
hypothesize legitimate goals to save the legislation. Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d
806, 815 (2d Cir. 1973).
72. The Court stated: "We deal with economic and social legislation where legislatures
have historically drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal
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that the community's objective of protecting its traditional family charac-
ter was a rational exercise of the state's police power.1
3
Although the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a fundamental
right to decent housing,74 several recent cases suggest that zoning ordi-
nances which infringe upon both the complainant's interest in mobility
and housing will receive more intense judicial scrutiny. In King v. New
Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 5 a district court held that the right
to travel was not necessarily based upon the commerce clause, that the
right to travel was not dependent on the crossing of state lines, and that
the right included intrastate movement. In Cole v. Housing Authority,"
the plaintiff, after changing residence, applied to a federally funded hous-
ing complex for admission. The plaintiff's application was rejected because
it failed to comply with a two-year residency requirement. The court held
that this two year requirement was invalid on two grounds: (1) it violated
the Federal Public Housing Act,77 and (2) it was unconstitutional under the
Shapiro holding. 8
The results in King and Cole suggest that the compelling interest stan-
Protection Clause if the law be 'reasonable, not arbitrary'. . and bears a 'rational relation-
ship to a (permissible] state objective.'" 416 U.S. at 8, quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
73. Although the Supreme Court decided Belle Terre using the minimum rationality stan-
dard of review, the result in Belle Terre is not inconsistent with arguments in favor of the
"sliding scale" level of review when important rights such as travel are involved. First, the
interests of the residents of a community must be ascertained and compared to the interests
of potential migrants. We must recall that Belle Terre was an extremely small community
comprised of only 220 homes. The relative impact the legislative regulation had upon the right
to travel was miniscule, and the deference to the legislature in this area of social welfare was
plausible. Because the Supreme Court declared that Belle Terre's objective of protecting the
family character of the community was within the police power of the state, the decision
shows that in this particular factual setting the rights of the current community members
outweighed the interests of potential migrants.
74. Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
75. 314 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The plaintiff challenged a statute which allowed
local agencies to adopt their own admissions standards to public units. The law required that
a family have at least one member who had been a resident of the city for five years before
application could be made for public housing. Relying on Shapiro, the district court held that
the five year requirement was unconstitutional.
76. 312 F. Supp. 692 (D.R.I.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-14 (1964).
78. The defendants in Cole asserted that the local requirement did not fall within the
ambit of the Shapiro ruling; they argued that the requirement did not abridge plaintiff's right
to travel because most people in the city would satisfy their housing needs on the private
market. The court declared that "the private market is inadequte as a matter of law." 312
F. Supp. at 697.
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dard applies in cases dealing with public housing residency requirements. 79
In fact, the appellate court's decision in Cole8" dealt specifically with the
standard of review to be applied in cases involving residency requirements
and the burden they place on the right to travel. The court recognized that
Shapiro did not state precisely what impact a residency requirement must
have upon the right to travel before strict scrutiny is applied. But the court
believed that the holding in Shapiro stood for "the proposition that a rule
penalizing travel requires a justification of a compelling state interest."',
The two-year requirement affecting public housing applicants imposed
such a penalty and thus triggered strict scrutiny.
It has been suggested that, if public housing exists within a community,
an attempt to limit the access of blacks or the poor to such housing through
the use of residency requirements is violative of the equal protection
clause. There is a contrast, however, between decisions wherein existing
public housing, rather than new public housing, is denied. In Valtierra v.
Housing Authority,82 plaintiffs challenged article 34 of the California Con-
stitution, which required voter approval of low-cost housing starts. The
federal district court held that this provision violated the equal protection
clause as it impeded minority groups and the poor in their attempt to
obtain federal housing assistance." The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the democratic right of referendum significantly outweighed the bur-
den imposed upon the challengers to obtain housing assistance. 4 The
Court refused to apply strict scrutiny after finding that article 34 made no
"distinctions based on race."" Although the Supreme Court made no di-
rect reference to the right to travel, the holding operates as a deterrent to
the population mobility argument.8" Of equal significance is that appar-
79. But see Lane v. McGarry, 320 F. Supp. 562, 563-64 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (applying the
traditional equal protection analysis in this area).
80. 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970).
81. Id. at 810 (emphasis added). The court went on to find that travel included migration
with the intent to settle and abide. Id. at 811.
82. 313 F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd sub nom. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
83. 313 F. Supp. at 4-6.
84. 402 U.S. at 141-43.
85. Id. at 141. Referendum laws containing explicit racial classifications are unlawful.
Hunter v. Erikson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). The referendum in Valtierra made no mention of race,
hut it did refer to low-income groups. The lower court had equated classes based upon wealth
with those based upon race. 313 F. Supp. at 4.
86. The result in Valtierra would probably have been the same had the challengers argued
that their right to travel had been abridged by virtue of article 34 of the California Constitu-
tion. The holding in Valtierra is consistent with the "sliding scale" level of review in equal
protection analysis. Such analysis would enable the court to weigh the interests of the demo-
cratic right to call a referendum against the penalty on the right to travel. Based upon the
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ently the referendum is a technique that may be used to effectively exclude
those who need new housing, particularly new public housing.
D. THE EXPANSION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN STATE COURTS
One technique that has been used successfully to attack the problem of
exclusionary zoning is a "broadened application" of due process
requirements applied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. It is argued
that the broadened application doctrine allows the court to review every
zoning regulation very carefully to determine in each factual setting
whether the regulation promotes the health, safety or general welfare of the
public. While the United States Supreme Court has recently subordinated
the right to travel in the equal protection area, the Court could, under the
broadened application test, give the right to travel new constitutional sig-
nificance.
In National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn,"7 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reviewed the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance (four-
acre minimum residential lot-size requirements) which had the direct ef-
fect of restricting population growth and mobility. The township relied on
four general welfare arguments to support its zoning regulation," each of
which was rejected by the court. The core of the National Land holding
was that a township could not use zoning to evade responsibilities imposed
by population growth.89 It is submitted that under the test used in National
Land, zoning is invalid if its major purpose is to impede the entrance of
newcomers, especially if it appears that the municipality is avoiding its
duties to the general public.
In perhaps the most important case applying a broadened application,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that local governments had an af-
holding in Valtierra, it is suggested that unless the democratic right to call a referendum is
blemished with some constitutionally impermissible taint (e.g., referendum laws explicitly
based on race, alienage, nationality), the right to call a referendum will override challenges
to restrictive referendum and zoning laws, even if those challenges are predicated upon the
fundamental right to travel.
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4919 (U.S. June 21, 1976),
the Supreme Court held that Ohio's Constitution specifically reserved to the people the right
of referendum and held that it does not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution.
87. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
88. The township argued that these minimum lot size restrictions were needed to assure
proper sewage disposal, to protect the local water supply from pollution, to prevent traffic
congestion on inadequate roadways, and to preserve the character of the community. 419 Pa.
504, 215 A.2d 597, 608-10 (1965).
89. The right to travel played an important role in the development of this principle. First,
the court stated its concern for the right of people to freely migrate. Restrictive zoning cannot
"stand in the way of the natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto
undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live." 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 597,
612 (1965).
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firmative duty to zone for multifamily housing, and not merely a duty to
review requests for variances in the single unit zoning laws.90 The decision
accepted the argument that no township may zone to avoid its share of the
natural population expansion created by urban migration to the suburbs.
By not including apartments within its zoning scheme, the township ex-
cluded people who would be able to move into the township if apartments
were available.9' The court rejected outright the township's argument that
the prohibition of apartment buildings was reasonably necessary to pre-
vent the overburdening of municipal services, facilities, and roadways.12 It
is submitted that the Pennsylvania court refused to sustain the local zon-
ing ordinance because it did not comply with the due process requirements
of a broadened application test.9 3
The broadened application of due process by the Pennsylvania court has
not been followed by the federal courts. In two recent cases the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of local zoning ordi-
nances using traditional due process and equal protection analyses. In
Ybarra v. City of the Town of Los Altos Hills,94 the zoning ordinance
required that a housing lot contain not less than one acre and that no lot
be occupied by more than one dwelling unit. This ordinance prohibited
construction of multifamily dwellings and thereby prevented low income
people from entering and living in Los Altos. As for the ordinance's re-
straint on population mobility, the court deferred to the determination
that local concerns outweighed regional burdens.95
90. In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 240, 263 A.2d 395, 396 (1970). The court said the duty existed
provided multifamily housing was in demand.
91. The court stated: "Statistics indicate that people are attempting to move away from
the urban core areas, relieving the grossly over-crowded conditions that exist in most of our
major cities. Figures show . . . most jobs . . . are in the suburbs." Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at
398.
92. Id. at 240-46, 263 A.2d at 396-99.
93. Under traditional due process analysis, the ordinances in National Land and Girsh
would have probably been sustained because they do tend to promote the general welfare.
However, in these cases the court.was extremely concerned with population mobility and thus
the right to travel. These opinions suggest that health, safety, and general welfare are not
limited to one town or city but are regional concepts. Furthermore, the cases imply that the
right to travel is a component of the health, safety, and general welfare of the public. As courts
across the nation confront the problems of regional development, the broadened application
of due process requirements may become increasingly popular in challenges to exclusionary
zoning.
For additional holdings advancing sound judicial thoughts on the subject of regional plan-
ning and the rights of individuals to enter into municipalities, see Township of Williston v.
Chesterdales Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Comm. 453, 300 A.2d 107 (1973); Appeal of Kitmar Builders,
Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
94. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
95. In its analysis of the case, the court seems to reason that since there is neither a suspect
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In Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of
Petaluma," plaintiffs challenged a city plan which fixed a housing devel-
opment growth rate at 500 dwelling units per year and which directed that
building permits be divided evenly between east and west sections of the
city and between single-family dwellings and multiple residence units.
Included in plaintiffs' challenge to the plan was a claim that the plan was
arbitrary and unreasonable and, therefore, violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 7 The court rejected this claim, stating that
"[t]he concept of the public welfare is sufficiently broad to uphold Petal-
uma's desire to preserve its small town character, its open spaces and low
density of population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate pace.""
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's response to exclusionary zoning
techniques provides the most plausible way to date to attack exclusionary
zoning. The reasoning adopted by that court combines a broader applica-
tion of due process requirements with the fundamental right of people to
travel and settle in municipalities of their choosing. It is submitted that
the traditional due process test is not strong enough to defeat exclusionary
zoning ordinances,99 and it has already been observed that the Burger
Court will limit the instances in which strict scrutiny applies.'" Whatever
rights the poor and minorities may have may be balanced away against the
rights of others.'"' It is therefore suggested that protection from exclusion-
ary zoning exists with the reasoning of the Pennsylvania court. Concern for
population growth, mobility and regional development automatically in-
volves the right to travel and triggers the broadened application due pro-
cess test.
classification nor a violation of a fundamental right requiring strict judicial scrutiny, the
locality needs to show only that the ordinance "bears a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest" in order to withstand challenges predicated upon the equal protection
clause. 503 F.2d at 254. The court further stated: "The ordinance is not arbitrary and does
not deny appellants due process." Id.
96. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
97. Id. at 906-07.
98. Id. at 909. One point that must be raised is that plaintiffs did rely heavily on the lower
court's finding that the actual effect of the city plan was to exclude substantial numbers of
people who would otherwise choose to live in Petaluma. Id. at 906. But the court rationalized:
"Practically all zoning restrictions have as a purpose and effect exclusion of some activity
a . .l ind in reviewing the reasonableness of the . ..ordinance . . . [we must determine
.. .whether the exclusion bears any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest." Id.
99. See text accompanying notes 30-31 & 94-98 supra.
100. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
101. Id.
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III. STANDING TO CHALLENGE EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
A discussion of the use of exclusionary zoning ordinances and the theo-
ries under which such ordinances are challenged is not complete without
consideration of which persons have the qualifications to challenge those
ordinances in court. One commentator considers the concept of standing
to be "among the most amorphous in the entire domain of public law."'' 0
A review of federal and state case law supports this statement and demon-
strates the difficulty in predicting the criteria courts will use in determin-
ing the question of standing in the future. Standing is a generic term which
is often confused with the concepts of mootness, ripeness, and justiciabil-
ity.' 3 The primary thrust of the standing doctrine, however, is the preser-
vation of the adversary system in the courts; this is usually achieved by
requiring parties in litigation to allege that they personally have been
injured.
The evolution of the issue in the federal courts has led to a requirement
that the plaintiff demonstrate a connection between a personal injury and
the alleged constitutional infringement.' 4 This is to insure satisfaction of
the "case or controversy" language of article III."05 In the state courts,
standing is usually attained if the petitioner can qualify as a "person
aggrieved."'0 6 The major problem with this term is in its interpretation;
state court systems, by virtue of their automony, have no uniform require-
ment and define the term differently. In most state jurisdictions, an indi-
vidual must show damage to a particular personal and legal interest, as
opposed to a general community interest.' 7
Although it appears that the standing requirement is similar in the two
forums, in reality it diverges. The federal courts comprise a unified system
deriving guidance from the Supreme Court, while the state courts lack
uniform guidance from a singular body.
102. Hearings on S. 2097 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 498 (1966) (remarks of Professor Paul
A. Freund).
103. See note 171 infra.
104. See notes 117-20 infra and accompanying text.
105. Article III specifies that the judicial power shall extend only to cases or controversies.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
106. See Section I. B. infra.
107. See 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 21.06 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 3
R. ANDERSONI; 2 E. YOKLEy, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 18-3 (3d Ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited
as 2 E. YOKIFYI; Ayer, The Primitive Law of Standing in Land Use Disputes: Some Notes
From a Dark Continent, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 344 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Ayer].
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A. FEDERAL COURTS
1. The Trend Toward Liberalization
The evolution of the standing doctrine in the federal courts has been
replete with misunderstanding at the lower court level. In 1939, the Su-
preme Court enunciated the legal interest test for standing.' 8 According
to this test, a person threatened with injury by government action does not
have standing to contest such action in court "unless the right invaded is
a legal right-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a
privilege.""1 9 The Supreme Court appears to have adhered to the legal
interest test"0 until 1968 when the Court in Flast v. Cohen"' modified the
standing doctrine by enunciating the nexus test. The Court held that for
the plaintiff to have standing, he must show "a logical link between [his]
status and the type of legislative enactment attacked . . .[and he] must
establish a nexus between [his] status and the precise nature of the con-
stitutional infringement alleged."' The Court's abandonment on the legal
interest test was completed two years later in Association of Data Process-
ing Service v. Camp,"' where the Court articulated a two-prong test for
standing:
Under that test plaintiffs must show that the challenged action has caused
them injury in fact, economic or otherwise, and that the interest sought to
be protected is arguably within the zone of interests protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'
Most commentators are agreed that the Court's departure from the legal
interest test in Flast and Data Processing marked the beginning of a trend
to liberalize requirements for standing in the federal courts."' 5 Whether
these two cases are seen as part of the same trend of thought, or as repre-
108. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939).
109. Id.
110. It is often difficult to tell what test the Court is applying because cases are frequently
decided without any mention of standing. This has caused Professor Singer to agree with the
criticism that in deciding if the plaintiffs have standing, "courts are determining the merits
of the controversy, not whether there is an injury per se." Singer, Justiciability and Recent
Supreme Court Cases, 21 ALA. L. REv. 229, 246 n.54 (1969).
111. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
112. Id. at 102.
113. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
114. Id. at 152-53.
115. See Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363
(1973); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court: A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645
(1973); Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A Behaviorial Analysis, 25 VAND. L.
REv. 479 (1972); Davis, The Liberalized Lau) of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970).
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senting two distinct standing doctrines, remains a subject of dispute al-
though the latter view appears to be correct.' Flast dealt with a taxpayer's
action challenging an alleged unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965."1 The plain-
tiff claimed that the congressional appropriation of funds used to finance
instruction in religious schools and to purchase textbooks for those schools
was an unconstitutional violation of the establishment clause's specific
limitation on Congress' power to tax and spend."" On the other hand, Data
Processing raised the question whether the ruling of the Comptroller of the
Currency allowing national banks to sell data processing services to cus-
tomers was permissible under the National Bank Act."9 One case dealt
with an alleged constitutional violation whereas the other involved an
alleged violation of agency authority as defined by the Administrative
Procedure Act.'
In the three years after Data Processing was decided, the Supreme Court
considered the question of standing in numerous other administrative law
cases.'2' Courts 2 and commentators23 during this period often failed to
distinguish between the administrative law cases and cases involving con-
stitutional questions. This caused very serious results. While Congress may
grant standing to individuals who could not qualify under the nexus test
of Flast, federal courts are bound not only by the requirements of article
III but also by prudential limitations on the exercise of their jurisdiction.24
Due to these limitations, plaintiffs relying on constitutional law issues
must meet more stringent requirements than those bringing suit under the
Administrative Procedure Act. The failure of federal courts to distinguish
the different requirements for standing resulted in confusion.
116. Compare Monaghan, supra note 115, with Davis, supra note 115.
117. 20 U.S.C. § 241(a) et seq., § 821 et seq. (1970).
118. 392 U.S. at 86-87.
119. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
120. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (1970).
121. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970).
122. See Sedler, supra note 115, at 489. For an example of a court which failed to distin-
guish the two, see Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C.
1971).
123. See, e.g., Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 450 (1970). Davis
says that "Iflour Supreme Court cases ... have drastically liberalized the federal law of
standing ... " Id. Of the four cases Davis cites, two were brought under the Administrative
Procedure Act, one under a specific statute and one involved an alleged constitutional viola-
tion.
124. See the discussion of statutory standing and prudential considerations, notes 174-75
infra and accompanying text.
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Recently, the Supreme Court has made it clear in cases involving consti-
tutional questions that the standing doctrine, while more liberal than it
was prior to 1968, is still stricter than that applied in cases of administra-
tive law.'1' While some members of the Court would advocate accepting
injury in fact as the sole test for standing,'2 1 the majority still requires a
sufficienu' nexus between the injury and the alleged constitutional viola-
tion. In United States v. Richardson,'27 the Court denied standing to a
federal taxpayer who alleged that certain provisions of the Central Intellig-
ence Act of 1949'1 violated article I, section 9 of the Constitution. The
taxpayer did not claim that funds were being spent in violation of a specific
constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power, but rather that
he could not obtain information on how the funds were being spent.12 9
While this lack of information may have in some way injured the taxpayer,
there was no nexus between that injury and his status as a taxpayer.'" The
Supreme Court distinguished Data Processing by saying that standing in
that case resulted from a specific statute giving the aggrieved party the
right to sue.'"' Standing was also denied in Schlesinger v. Reservists Com-
mittee to Stop the War'' 2 because the plaintiffs claim did not pass the
nexus test. Chief Justice Burger stated that generalized citizen interest is
not enough and the fact that no one might be able to sue if the plaintiffs
could not was not determinative.' 3
This type of reasoning can have a drastic effect on standing in exclusion-
ary zoning cases. Often the plaintiffs are potential residents who are alleg-
ing harm to themselves and others similarly situated and therefore are
susceptible to having their claims labeled as "generalized citizen inter-
est."'" The claims of existing residents have been likely to fail because
"[o]rdinarily, one may not claim standing. . . to vindicate the constitu-
125. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974).
126. This is the position of Justices Brennan, White, Douglas, and Marshall. See Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518-30 (1975) (dissenting opinions of Justices Douglas and Brennan,
with whom Justice White joined); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Respondents' complaint therefore states. . . a claim of direct
and concrete injury to a judicially cognizable interest." Id. at 239.
127. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
128. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403 (1951).
129. 418 U.S. at 169.
130. Id. at 175.
131. Id. at 176 n.9.
132. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
133. Id. at 227.
134. As Chief Justice Burger said in Schlesinger, "[olur system of government leaves
many crucial decisions to the political processes." Id.
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tional rights of some third party." ' : ' However, three considerations have
prompted the Court to depart from this rule in the past: (1) the importance
of the relationship between the claimant and the third parties, (2) the
impossibility of rightholders asserting their own constitutional rights and
(3) the need to avoid a dilution of third parties' constitutional rights., 6 At
times the Court will be persuaded by these considerations and allow one
to assert a claim of jus tertii.'31 Such a claim may enable a landowner in
an exclusionary zoning case to allege that the zoning impairs his ability to
sell or lease his property while also infringing upon the constitutional rights
of outsiders to settle and abide. On the other hand, a claim ofjus tertii
will not enable a landowner who is not presently being injured, or about
to be injured, to assert the constitutional rights of potential residents.' 3
In conclusion, while standing requirements in non-statutory constitu-
tional cases have been liberalized, some showing of injury in fact and a
sufficient nexus between the injury and the constitutional infringement
alleged are still necessary. The injury is not confined to an economic harm
nor is it required to be an injury to a legal right. But despite this broaden-
ing of the concept of standing, the door is still closed to many plaintiffs
alleging a constitutional infringement of their rights. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the area of exclusionary zoning.
2. Residents of the Municipality
There are very few federal exclusionary zoning cases which have dis-
cussed standing. In those that did, the main emphasis was on non-
residents. Residents were found to have standing where they asserted a
personal harm, usually of an economic nature. They were denied standing
where they alleged injury to the constitutional rights of third parties. This
can be illustrated by examining the treatment of standing for residents in
Warth v. Seldin'35 and in Construction Industry Association of Sonoma
County v. City of Petaluma.'4"
In Petaluma a plan of phased growth provided for construction of a
maximum of 500 new housing units each year, holding the growth of the
135. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
136. Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 441 (1974).
137. A claim of jus tertii is defined as "a litigant's claim that a single application of a law
both injures him and infringes upon the constitutional rights of third persons." Id. at 424.
138. "ITihe federal courts have consistently adhered to one major proposition without
exception: one who has no interest of his own at stake lacks standing." Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 617 (1968) (emphasis in original).
139. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
140. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
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population to about six percent per year. Two landowners and a builders
association filed suit alleging personal economic harm and denial of the
constitutional rights of future residents. One of the landowners was a resi-
dent of Petaluma although most of the land he owned was outside the city.
The court of appeals had no difficulty finding standing for the resident and
nonresident contiguous landowners to assert that the plan operated to
reduce the value and marketability of their land."' But it reversed the
district court's ruling that the plaintiffs had standing to assert that the
Petaluma plan infringes on third parties' alleged constitutional right to
travel.'42 The court said that the economic interests of the landowners and
the builders association were outside the zone of interest protected by the
alleged constitutional right to travel.'
3. Nonresidents of the Municipality
Nonresidents in exclusionary zoning cases fall into three categories: de-
velopers of low-cost housing and their backers who are often civic or reli-
gious associations, future residents and contiguous property owners. In
Dailey v. City of Lawton,"' the Tenth Circuit did not question the standing
of a nonprofit corporation which was requesting a change in zoning in order
to build a low-income housing project. Columbia Square, the corporation,
and Dailey, a prospective tenant, sued the city, alleging that the city's
denial of rezoning was based on racial animus."' The court enjoined the
city from denying Columbia Square the building permit without even dis-
cussing the issue of standing."'4 In the same year, the Second Circuit found
that the Kennedy Park Homes Association had standing to challenge a
city's rezoning of an area in which it planned to build a low-income housing
project.'17 The Association was technically not a landowner, but it did have
a commitment for a definite site and financial assistance from the FHA."18
The court said that this was enough to show that it was capable of building
the project in question, being prevented from doing so only by the zoning
ordinance.'
141. Id. at 905.
142. Plaintiffs could, however, challenge the reasonableness of the statute. For a discussion
of the court's holding on the merits see notes 96-98 supra and accompanying text.
143. 52 2 F.2d at 904.
144. 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
145. Id. at 1038. The suit was brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970).
146. Id.
147. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
148. Id. at 112.
149. Id. at 109. The Association alleged racial animus and sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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The Ninth Circuit has found that an organization with an option to buy
a specific tract of land, with definite plans for a particular housing project,
had standing to attack a referendum which nullified a zoning ordinance.,' "
The Eighth Circuit has also allowed both prospective tenants and a non-
profit developer to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance which
effectively prohibits the construction of multiracial, federally subsidized,
low- and moderate-income housing.'-'
All of these cases have one important point in common: the nonresident
plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination. The plaintiffs in some of the cases
alleged discrimination in violation of a statute which specifically granted
them standing. While Congress may not confer standing where there is no
injury, where Congress has provided standing to individuals harmed by
violation of a specific statute, the courts tend to accept this legislative
judgment and proceed to the merits of the case. Whether there is a suffi-
cient nexus between the harm incurred and the statutory violation alleged
is determined upon the court's deciding the merits of the case and may not
be used as a means of avoiding difficult substantive questions. Of course,
this does not mean that a plaintiff can gain standing simply by alleging
violation of any statute; he must sue under a statute that specifically
confers the right to sue upon certain people considered to be aggrieved
persons. 152
Plaintiffs in cases where no statute was mentioned or where the statute
did not confer any standing rights had standing by claiming personal in-
jury caused by racial discrimination. Freedom from racial discrimination
is a well-settled right, and if its denial is asserted by the proper parties,
(1970) as well as under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970).
150. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th
Cir. 1970). The organization alleged discrimination against Mexican-American residents of
Union City.
151. Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1972).
Plaintiffs based their claim on various statutory and constitutional provisions, and the court
held that the plaintiffs demonstrated "'a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'
l . . [and that the dispute will be presented in a form capable of judicial resolution." Id.
at 1213, quoting in part Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
See also Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972) (per curiam). In that case future residents and developers were allowed to sue on the
basis of racial discrimination. The court did not discuss the basis for granting standing except
to rule that the individual plaintiffs had the right to sue for themselves and all others
currently on the waiting list of the Atlanta Housing Authority for low-rent public housing.
152. The Administrative Procedure Act is such a statute. The APA provides that:
[al person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
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federal courts will proceed to consider the case on its merits. The cases
discussed indicate that proper parties include prospective tenants who are
currently on a waiting list for a particular project or who can demonstrate
their ability to reside in a particular project but for the exclusionary zoning
ordinance.' ' The developers of these projects were also held to have stand-
ing both in their own right and to assert the constitutional rights of their
prospective tenants.' 4 Whether alleging racial animus alone (absent a
showing of direct personal injury) would be enough to give plaintiffs stand-
ing had been left an open question by lower federal courts. The Supreme
Court in Warth v. Seldin has stated that such an allegation does not satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement.'55
Standing for nonresidents is less of a problem in exclusionary zoning
cases which involve contiguous landowners because these cases are usually
brought on a claim of direct economic injury rather than racial animus. In
Township of River Vale v. Town of Orangetown,5 the Second Circuit held
that a New Jersey township had standing to challenge the validity of a
zoning ordinance passed not in New Jersey but in New York.'5 7 The
township of River Vale claimed that the challenged rezoning of Orange-
town would result in a lowering of property values within the township and,
therefore, constituted a taking without due process of law.' 8 The court held
that the claim of reduction in property values "with resulting reduction in
township revenues alleges a sufficiently direct injury to give the township
standing to sue."'5 ' 9 Thus, a contiguous landowner might successfully chal-
lenge a zoning ordinance passed by the neighboring municipality by alleg-
ing that the ordinance lowers the value of his property. This contiguous
landowner may also be able to assert the constitutional rights of those who
desire to live in the zoning municipality, but who cannot due to the chal-
lenged ordinance, if these third parties are unable to bring their own ac-
tion.1'8
153. Compare Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), afl'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th
Cir. 1972) (per curiam) with Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208
(8th Cir. 1972).
154. See Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972),
where the court said: "The interests of the corporate and individual plaintiffs coincide be-
cause both desire to be free from the discriminatory zoning." Id. at 1213.
155. See notes 161-86 infra and accompanying text.
156. 403 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1968).
157. Id. at 686.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 686-87.
160. See the discussion on claims ofjus tertii at notes 135-38 supra and accompanying text.
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4. The Supreme Court's Limitation on Standing: Warth v. Seldin
In Warth the Supreme Court settled many questions regarding standing
which had confused courts and commentators alike since the Data
Processing decision in 1970. The Court may also have revealed a degree of
antagonism toward challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances.' 1 Warth
involved a suit by various organizations and individual residents in the
Rochester, New York metropolitan area against the town of Penfield, an
incorporated municipality adjacent to Rochester and against members of
Penfield's zoning, planning, and town boards.'
Eight individual petitioners, none of whom were residents of Penfield,
brought suit as a class action.' 1 They were joined by Metro-Act of Roches-
ter, Inc., a nonprofit corporation formed "to alert ordinary citizens of prob-
lems of social concern . . . and to urge action on the part of citizens to
alleviate the general housing shortage for low- and moderate-income per-
sons."'6 4 All of the petitioners wanted the court to declare Penfield's zoning
ordinance unconstitutional and to order the defendants to enact a new
ordinance which would alleviate their individual problems. 6 '
It was alleged that Penfield's zoning ordinance, by effectively excluding
persons of low or moderate income, violated petitioners' constitutional
rights as well as their rights under the federal Civil Rights Acts.'66 Petition-
ers also alleged that the town had made it impossible for persons of low or
moderate income to find housing in Penfield by various other acts such as
arbitrary denial of variances, denial of proposals for low- and moderate-
cost housing in an arbitrary manner and refusal to allow tax abatements.' 7
After considering in detail each individual petitioner's claim, the Supreme
Court rejected all of them for lack of standing.'68
In addition to these petitioners, the Rochester Home Builders Associa-
161. 422 U.S. at 518 (Justice Douglas dissenting).
162. Id. at 493.
163. Four of the petitioners were taxpayers and residents of Rochester who claimed that
Penfield's exclusionary zoning practices forced Rochester to impose higher taxes on them. Id.
at 493-94.
164. Id. at 494.
165. Id. at 496.
166. Petitioners pointed to the first, ninth, and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution and to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83 (1970). They asserted that:
[O]nly 0.3% of the land available for residential construction [in Penfield] is allo-
cated to multi-family structures. . . and even on this limited space, housing for low-
and moderate-income persons is not economically feasible because of low density and
other requirements. Id. at 495.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 518.
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tion and the Housing Council of Monroe County requested leave to
intervene as plaintiffs. The Home Builders Association was made up of
firms engaged in residential construction in the Rochester area and the
Housing Council was a nonprofit corporation comprised of private and
public organizations interested in housing problems."9 The Housing Coun-
cil provided an affidavit that one of its members-Penfield Better Homes
Corporation-" 'is and has been actively attempting to develop moderate
income housing' in Penfield, 'but has been stymied by its inability to
secure the necessary approvals. . . ." '10
In considering the standing of these various petitioners, the Supreme
Court made clear at the outset exactly what standard it was using to
determine standing: "This inquiry involves both constitutional limitations
on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise."','
The Court in Warth elucidated its standing doctrine by explaining that a
plaintiff may have conventional article III standing by showing a real or
threatened injury and still be denied standing by the Court's own limita-
tions. Standing was said to include judicially-fashioned limitations on ac-
cess to the federal courts such as the requirement that the harm be of a
particularized rather than a generalized nature 2 and the requirement that
a plaintiff cannot base his claim on the legal rights of third parties.7 3
Plaintiffs can escape the prudential limitations of the standing doctrine if
Congress grants them an express right of action, but plaintiffs can never
escape the article I1 requirements.'74 In Warth, none of the plaintiffs could
gain standing by bringing suit under sections 1981, 1982, or 1983 because
none of these statutes provided any special standing to sue.7 5 Since none
169. Id. at 497.
170. Id., quoting Appellant's Brief at 174.
171. Id. at 498. This is very unlike many of the lower federal court analyses in which the
courts often denied or allowed standing without any statement as to their criteria. In fact,
one lower federal court has said that standing and justiciability are "doctrines between which
no clear distinction is generally found." Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d
920, 928 n.13 (2d Cir. 1968). Fortunately, the Supreme Court in Worth had no problem
distinguishing the two:
[Sitanding imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a 'case or con-
troversy' between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. Il. This is
the threshold question in every federal case .... As an aspect of justiciability, the
standing question is whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy' to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and
to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf. 422 U.S. at 498-99,
quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
172. Id. at 499.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 501.
175. Lower federal courts have sometimes confused the alleging of a violation of a particu-
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of the petitioners had a statutory right to bring suit, they would be sub-
jected to both article IH and prudential consideration standing analysis.
The Court first considered the claim of the individual petitioners who
had asserted that they and the class of people they represented had been
excluded from living in Penfield due to lack of housing for persons of low
or moderate income. Although they had alleged that they searched for
housing in Penfield, they failed to show that they would, in all probability,
have been able to find housing were it not for Penfield's exclusionary
zoning or that if the court provided the relief requested, such housing
would then be made available.' 7 The Warth Court distinguished lower
court cases in which nonresidents had been granted standing by noting
that, in those cases, the nonresidents were either on a waiting list for a
particular housing project, or had demonstrated that they were qualified
to reside in a project which was being stymied by exclusionary zoning and
that a judicial remedy could provide them the relief they needed. 7 '
The Warth Court then considered the claims of the four additional peti-
tioners who had alleged they were being harmed as taxpayers of Rochester.
The Court had little problem in disposing of this claim because it not only
failed to show a causal relation between the harm suffered and the exclu-
sionary zoning practiced in Penfield, but these petitioners were also de-
pending upon the constitutional rights of third parties. As residents of
lar statute with bringing an action under a statute that gives plaintiffs a specific right to sue.
Compare Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970) (court failed to mention
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) does not provide any special standing rights) with Park View
Heights Corp v. City of Black Jack, 467 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1972) (court recognized special
standing rights under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 but not under the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
176. It appeared that petitioners' inability to reside in Penfield may be due to the general
economics of the housing market. Petitioners were not subject to the exclusionary zoning
ordinance because they were not residents of Penfield; neither did they have any property
interest in Penfield nor had they been denied a variance by Penfield's zoning officials. These
petitioners did not even meet the minimum article III standing requirements for, while they
had suffered a harm, they did not show a sufficient causal connection between the harm they
suffered and the constitutional rights which they alleged were abridged. 422 U.S. at 505-07.
177. See cases cited notes 143-54 supra and accompanying text. However, Warth does not
stand for the proposition that nonresidents cannot have standing to sue. The Court emphati-
cally said:
[Wie hold only that a plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices
must allege specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm
him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the courts' interven-
tion. 422 U.S. at 508 (emphasis in original).
The Court added in a footnote that "[tihis is not to say that the plaintiff. . . must have a
present contractual interest in a particular project. . . . But usually the initial focus should
be on a particular project." Id. at 508 n.18.
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Rochester, they had no constitutional or statutory right "to be free of
action by a neighboring municipality that may have some incidental ad-
verse effect on Rochester."'" 8 Rules of prudential considerations were held
to bar these petitioners from asserting the rights of third parties unless a
statute specifically allowed them to do so or they could demonstrate that
their suit was necessary because the third parties were unable to assert
their own rights.' 9
Finally, the Court denied standing to the three associations: Metro-Act,
Housing Council, and Rochester Home Builders Association. Metro-Act
had alleged harm to the 9% of its membership that resided in Penfield who
were deprived of living in an integrated community due to Penfield's exclu-
sionary zoning.' The Court was able to deny standing to Metro-Act by
distinguishing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 81 upon
which petitioners had relied. In Trafficante, the plaintiffs had based their
cause of action on a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,12 which has a
specific section granting standing to sue to persons alleging purposeful
racial or ethnic discrimination.' Metro-Act did not and could not allege
a cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts of 1968.
The Home Builders Association would probably have had standing if it
could have alleged that any of its members were currently being deprived
of business opportunities and profits as a result of Penfield's zoning prac-
tices. But the complaint did not refer to any current project or to any
member who had applied for and been denied a variance or building per-
mit for a current project.84 Therefore, Home Builders failed to allege a
harm of sufficient immediacy to support its intervention. Housing Council,
however, did allege that one of its members had been denied a zoning
variance for moderate-cost housing. But the denial had occurred in 1969,
three years before filing of the instant suit, and there was no allegation that
the project was still viable, "or that respondents' actions continued to
block a then-current construction project."'"
Warth teaches that plaintiffs in future zoning cases should take care to
set forth their complaint with as much specificity as possible. Plaintiffs
especially need to make clear to the court how its relief could help them.
178. Id. at 509.
179. Id. at 510.
180. Id. at 512.
181. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970).
184. 422 U.S. at 516.
185. Id. at 517.
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Furthermore, plaintiffs who are suing as nonresidents must show a close
connection between their legal interests and a particular housing project
which the exclusionary zoning is blocking. Such a connection may be
shown by their presence on a waiting list, paying an apartment deposit,
haying a contract to buy a specific house, or, in the case of a developer, a
commitment to purchase a tract of land. Future residents must also allege
that, were it not for the exclusionary zoning, they would be able to obtain
housing in the area.""
B. STATE COURTS
Access to the state courts to contest zoning restrictions may be sought
in a variety of ways. 18 The more common actions brought are for judicial
review of administrative decisions, '9 declaratory relief,'8 9 injunctive re-
lief,"'8 " or mandamus."' The latter three actions are often founded on consti-
tutional grounds while the former is usually based on administrative
grounds; state courts frequently fail to distinguish the two grounds insofar
as standing requirements are concerned.'92 Although these requirements
may be incorrect, the courts have nevertheless applied them consistently.
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, 9 3 which provides for judicial
review of decisions of the board of adjustments,' 4 is the mold from which
186. Some of these suggestions are found in 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 944 (1975).
187. For a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which zoning controversies reach the
courts in Virginia, see Note, Land Use Law in Virginia, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 513, 539-40 (1975).
188. This review ordinarily requires that the appellant be a "person or persons, jointly or
severally, aggrieved." See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 107, §§ 21.01-.06 (1968).
189. Declaratory judgment actions ordinarily require that the plaintiff have a substantial
interest, usually pecuniary, that will be seriously affected. See, e.g., Brechner v. Incorporated
Village of Lake Success, 23 Misc. 2d 159, 201 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See also 3 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 107, § 24.03.
190. Injunctive relief normally requires that the plaintiff allege and prove special damages
peculiar to him. See, e.g., Schubach v. Silver, 9 Pa. 152, 305 A.2d 896 (1973), citing Burne v.
Kearney, 424 Pa. 29, 225 A.2d 892 (1967). See also 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 107, § 23.11.
191. Mandamus proceedings are generally available to an "aggrieved person" or to one
having a "sufficient interest." See, e.g., Lynch v. Gates, 433 Pa. 531, 252 A.2d 633 (1969)
(injury and damage not common to all other property owners). See also 3 R. ANDERSON, supra
note 107, §§ 22.02-.03.
192. Ayer, supra note 107, at 346. See Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Local
Zoning Decisions: Restricted Access to State Courts and the Alternative Federal Forum, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 598, 599. n.5, 600-01 (1971); Note, Extending Standing to Nonresidents-A
Response to the Exclusionary Effects of Zoning Fragmentation, 24 VAND. L. REV. 341, 355,
359 (1971).
193. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 7 (1926) [hereinafter referred to as the Stan-
dard Act]. The Standard Act, published by the United States Department of Commerce, is
reproduced at 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 107, § 21.02.
194. Many states retain the nomenclature "board of adjustment" while others, including
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many of the present state zoning enabling statutes were cast. The Act
provides in part:
[Ainy person or persons, jointly or severally, aggrieved by any decision of
the board of adjustment, or any taxpayer, or any officer, department, board,
or bureau of the municipality, may present to a court of record a petition,
duly verified, setting forth that such decision is illegal, in whole or in part,
specifying the grounds of the illegality.'9 5
One of the more common modifications to the Standard Act's section on
standing has been the deletion of the phrase "or any taxpayer."'96 The
natural inference to be drawn is that access to the courts is easier in those
states retaining the "taxpayer" language;'97 however, no firm conclusion
can be made as the courts have reached inconsistent results. 98
Although the "person aggrieved" language is found in practically all of
the state zoning enabling statutes, few of them offer any guidance in defin-
ing the term.'99 The courts have been left to determine, on a case-by-case
basis, what constitutes standing for judicial review of a decision of the
board of zoning appeals. Consequently, conflicts abound among the states
concerning the standing requirements for persons seeking judicial review.
A minority of states have either reduced or circumvented the problem of
ambiguity by more clearly delineating who shall have standing to appeal
zoning restrictions.9 9 In a few states, judicial review of zoning decisions is
Virginia, use "board of zoning appeals" or some similar phrase. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-497
(Cum. Supp. 1975). The difference appears to be semantical and not substantive.
195. For a recent summary and comparison of the various state zoning enabling statutes
see 3 HOFsTRA L. REV. 795, 799 n.18 (1975).
196. See, e.g., N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 7-740 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
197. See generally 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 107, § 21.06.
198. See Boryszewski v. Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361, 334 N.E.2d 579, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1975);
M. & R. Enterprises, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 155 Conn. 280, 231 A.2d 272 (1967); Scott
v. Board of Adjustment, 405 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. 1966). But see D'Almeida v. Sheldon Realty
Co., 105 R.I. 317, 252 A.2d 23 (1969); Blumberg v. Hill, 119 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
199. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 107, § 21.05; Comment, Standing to Appeal Zoning
Determinations: The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1070 (1966); Note,
The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 294 (1967).
200. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-8 (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("any person owning land
which abuts the land involved"). The most notable, both for its clarity and broadness, is the
New Jersey statute which allows for challenge to the zoning laws by:
any person, whether residing within or without the municipality, whose right to use,
acquire, or enjoy property is or may be effected [sic] by any action taken ... or whose
rights to use, acquire, or enjoy property . . .under any other law of this State or of
the United States have been denied, violated or infringed by an action or a failure to
act .... N.J. Rav. STAT. § 40.55-47.1 (Supp. 1975).
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covered by the respective state's Administrative Procedure Act.2" ' In most
jurisdictions, in order to show aggrievement an individual must show that
the challenged zoning violates a particular personal and legal interest, as
opposed to a general community-shared interest.0 2 The traditional focus
has been on some legal or equitable interest in land.0 "
I. Residents of the Municipality
An owner, 21 co-owner, 215 tenant,26  or prospective vendee 20 7 of land is
generally accorded the status of an "aggrieved party,"200 with the right to
challenge zoning ordinances in state courts. With respect to neighboring
landowners within the municipality, the problem becomes more complex
as the distance between the challenged zoning and the affected property
becomes greater. An adjoining landowner ordinarily has the right to ap-
peal.2 " The courts have been inconsistent with respect to those relatively
near, but not adjoining, the property involved. In cases which did find
standing for this category of plaintiffs, the incurrence of special damage
201. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 46-4(b) (1968) and § 91-14 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 24, § 11-13-13 (1962) (cities and villages), ch. 34, § 3157 (1960) (counties). As a precaution,
one should always ascertain whether local planning or zoning commissions are covered by
definition under a state's Administrative Procedure Act. If they are, attention should be
directed to the section governing judicial review to determine the requirements for standing.
Regarding the relevancy of Virginia's new Administrative Process Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-
6.14:1 to -6.14:20 (Cum. Supp. 1975), see note 244 infra and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Gregorio v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 155 Conn. 422, 232 A.2d 330 (1967);
Bryniarski v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 247 Md. 137, 230 A.2d 289 (1967). See 3
R. ANDERSON, supra note 107, § 21.06; 2 E. YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACrICE § 18-3 (3d ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as E. YOKLEY]; Ayer, supra note 107, at 346.
203. Note, 8 WM. & MARY L. REv., supra note 199, at 295-96. Some courts have taken a
broader view in interpreting the qualifications of a "person aggrieved" and allow an appeal
so long as the person is damaged within the scope of the purposes of the zoning ordinance.
E.g., Krejpcio v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 152 Conn. 657, 211 A.2d 687 (1965); O'Connor v.
Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A.2d 515 (1953).
204. See, e.g., Durocher v. King County, 80 Wash. 2d 139, 492 P.2d 547 (1972).
205. See, e.g., Hayden v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 26 Conn. Supp. 168, 214 A.2d 837 (1965).
206. See, e.g., Lavere v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 39 App. Div. 2d 639, 331 N.Y.S.2d 141
(1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 873, 307 N.E.2d 559, 352 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1973).
207. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 158 Conn. 497, 264 A.2d 566 (1969);
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). The majority view is
that the equitable owner of land has a sufficient interest to demonstrate "aggrievement."
208. For a general discussion of the qualification of these parties as "persons aggrieved"
see 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 107, § 21.07; Comment, 64 MICH. L. REV., supra note 199; Note,
8 WM. & MARY L. REV., supra note 199, at 296-302.
209. See, e.g., Sarah Lawrence College v. City Council, 48 App. Div. 2d 897, 369 N.Y.S.2d
776 (1975); East Diamond Head Ass'n v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 479 P.2d 796 (Hawaii 1971)
(according to provisions for review in Hawaii's Administrative Procedure Act. But see Kyser
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 155 Conn. 236, 230 A.2d 595 (1967).
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to the plaintiffs' property was found to have resulted from a zoning deter-
mination concerning another's land. 10
2. Nonresidents of the Municipality
The state courts have generally held that nonresidents of a municipality
cannot challenge its zoning regulations, even if their property is adjacent
or contiguous to the questioned zoning."' They have equated the lack of
property within the municipality with a lack of "person aggrieved" status,
and, consequently, with a lack of standing. Other.courts have permitted
nonresident landowners to challenge the zoning restrictions of adjacent
communities,1 2 apparently on the grounds that nonresidents have stand-
ing "if [they] can allege and prove specific damages as a result of an
adjoining district's action. 21
The language in some of the cases does suggest an embryonic develop-
ment of the regional approach to local zoning by the courts. In Dahman v.
City of Ballwin, 2 1 the Missouri court held that a nonresident separated
from the zoning city by a corporate boundary line had standing to chal-
lenge the validity of a proposed zoning classification of adjacent land,
recently annexed into the city. The same court also found standing in Allen
v. Coffel, 2' where nonresident owners of property contiguous to the zoning
municipality had brought suit.21 In Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 217 plain-
210. See 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 107, § 21.10; 2 E. YOKLEY, supra note 202, § 18-3; Note,
8 Whi. & MARY L. REv., supra note 202, at 303-04.
211. See Cablevision-Division of Sammons Communications, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
320 A.2d 388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974); Town of Huntington v. Town Bd., 57 Misc. 2d 821, 293
N.Y.S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Wood v. Freeman, 43, Misc. 2d 616, 251 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup.
Ct. 1964), afl'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 704, 262 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1965); Village of Russell Gardens v.
Board of Zoning & Appeals, 30 Misc. 2d 392, 219 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1961). Accord, 3 R.
ANDERSON, supra note 107, § 21.10 at 568-69; Ayer, supra note 107, at 356; Comment, 64 MICH.
L. REv., supra note 199, at 1079. But see Note, 8 Wt. & MARY L. REv., supra note 199, at
304-05.
212. See Braghirol v. Town Bd., 70 Misc. 2d 812, 334 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1972); Whittingham
v. Village of Woodridge, 111 Ill. App. 2d 147, 249 N.E.2d 332 (1969) (a corporate boundary
line should not deny a nonresident landowner standing, if special damage could be shown to
result by reason of the zoning change); Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co., 152 Colo. 567, 384 P.2d
96 (1963) (nonresident landowners would be similarly affected by the zoning as resident
landowners, and, further, would have no other means of representing their interests); Koppel
v. City of Fairway, 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113 (1962) (statute applied to all "affected property
owners" and not simply to residents of zoning municipality); Hamelin v. Zoning Bd., 19
Conn. Supp. 445, 117 A.2d 86 (1955).
213. Note, 8 WM. & MARY L. REv., supra note 199, at 305.
214. 483 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. App. 1972).
215. 488 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. App. 1972).
216. The court stated:
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tiffs were inadvertently mailed notice of a hearing concerning the proposed
development of abutting property in Indian Wells. The California court,
after finding that plaintiffs and all other neighboring property owners had
standing, noted that "local zoning may have even a regional impact."2 18 In
a more recent California case," 9 the court declared that "[e]ffects of envi-
ronmental abuse are not contained by political lines; strict rules of stand-
ing that might be appropriate in other contexts have no application where
broad and long-term effects are involved."""0
The increasing protection afforded to nonresident, contiguous property
owners may be misleading. Those gaining access to the courts in "bound-
ary cases" 2 may just as likely be seeking to exclude as to include low- and
moderate-income housing. A neighboring community often would be
challenging the ordinance on the grounds that it lowers property values in
both communities. It has been noted previously that high property values
discourage the entry of low- and moderate-income classes. However, these
cases have been significant for having recognized a burgeoning regional
perspective in local zoning.
Courts have consistently failed to find standing in suits brought by civic
and property owners associations2 2 to appeal zoning regulations, even
though they represent resident taxpayers of the zoning municipality. 2 3 The
[Ilt is now well established that an adjoining, confronting or nearby property owner
has standing, without further proof of special damage, to assert the invalidity of an
ordinance....
The decline of rural residence and the burgeoning growth of suburban communities,
frequently clustered on the periphery of metropolitan centers, have made it apparent
that the impact of zoning is no longer of concern only to the enacting municipality,
but may have extraterritorial effects as well. Id. at 675 (emphasis added).
217. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
218. Id., 492 P.2d at 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 749.
219. Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 249 (1975).
220. Id., 529 P.2d at 1023, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 255 (emphasis added).
221. Ayer, supra note 195, at 356; Comment, 64 MICH. L. REV., supra note 199, at 1080.
222. For a definition and analysis of the term "civic association" see 3 HoFSTRA L. REV.
795, 802 n.30 (1975).
223. See, e.g., Stocksdale v. Barnard, 239 Md. 541, 212 A.2d 282 (1965); Point Lookout
Civic Ass'n v. Town of Hempstead, 22 Misc. 2d 757, 200 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd,
12 App. Div. 2d 505, affd, 9 N.Y.2d 961, 176 N.E.2d 203, 217 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1961); Miller v.
Dassler, 1 App. Div. 2d 975, 150 N.Y.S.2d 845 (1956) (unincorporated property owners asso-
ciation not entitled to intervene as adverse party in proceeding); see 3 R. ANDERSON, supra
note 107, § 21.07 at 563; Ayer, supra note 107, at 359; Note, 24 VAND. L. REV., supra note
192, at 357-58; Note, 8 WM. & MARY L. REV., supra note 199, at 306.
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lack of property ownership2 4 and taxpayer status has led the courts to hold
these associations incapable of qualifying as "aggrieved persons." 2
A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals joins a growing
minority of jurisdictions which do recognize standing of civic associations
to contest zoning restrictions. 2 1 In Douglaston Civic Association v.
Galvin,22 the New York court recently recognized the standing of a prop-
erty owners association to contest the grant of a variance for construction
of a multifamily dwelling in a single family district. The application for a
variance was opposed by the association and nearby.residents at the public
hearing before the board. After the variance was granted, the homeowners
and the association sought judicial review of the decision. Rather than
conform to the "aggrieved person" test, the court enunciated a new rule
of standing which, it has been suggested, 2 1 will enable qualifying civic
associations in New York to challenge legislative as well as administrative
zoning decisions. The court indicated that four factors should be consid-
ered in determining whether an organization may sue as the appropriate
representative of its members:
(1) [T]he capacity of the organization to assume an adversary position, (2)
the size and composition of the organization as reflecting a position fairly
224. For a situation in which a civic association did own property see Shore Acres Improve-
ment Ass'n v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Appeals, 251 Md. 310, 247 A.2d 402 (1968). The
court held that the association was not an "aggrieved person" due to the distance of its
property from the questioned zoning and the fact that the two tracts of land were not within
sight of one another. See 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 802 n.31 (1975).
225. See, e.g., Manor Woods Ass'n v. Randol, 29 App. Div. 2d 778, 287 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968)
(individual homeowners in the immediate residential area would be "aggrieved persons"
within the meaning of the relevant statute); Lido Beach Civic Ass'n v. Board of Zoning
Appeals, 13 App. Div. 2d 1030, 217 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1961).
226. East Camelback Homeowners Ass'n v. Arizona Foundation for Neurology & Psychia-
try, 19 Ariz. App. 118, 505 P.2d 286 (1973), aff'g 18 Ariz. App. 121, 500 P.2d 906 (1972)
(although homeowners association allowed to attack grant by board of adjustment, issue of
standing was not raised); Citizens for Better Gov't v. County of Valley, 95 Idaho 320, 508 P.2d
550 (1973) (standing issue not discussed); Garden Dist. Property Owners Ass'n v. City of New
Orleans, 98 So. 2d 922 (La. App. 1957); North Shore Beach Property Owners Ass'n v. Town
of Brookhaven, 115 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
In Raum v. Board of Supervisors, 342 A.2d 450 (Pa. Comwlth. 1975), intervening challeng-
ers (referred to as "Main Line") were granted standing along with landowner-developers.
Main Line was comprised of: (1) Main Line Housing Improvement Corporation; (2) Main
Line Community Association; (3) residents of the township who desired low-income housing;
and (4) nonresidents of the township who also desired low-income housing. The court ac-
knowledged the standing of the township residents (both on their own and on behalf of the
civic association) and determined that the remaining appellants had "derivative standing"
as a result thereof. Id. at 458.
227. 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974).
228. 3 HoFsTRA L. REV., supra note 224, at 809 (1975).
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representative of the community or interests which it seeks to protect...
(3) the adverse effect of the decision sought to be reviewed on the group
represented by the organization as within the zone of interests to be protected
• . . [and (4)] full participating membership in the representative organiza-
tion be open to all residents and property owners in the relevant neighbor-
hood.O
The grant of standing to a property owners association is a double-edged
sword. Groups interested in strictly enforcing zoning regulations would
have standing to contest a zoning determination favorable to low- and
moderate-income people, thereby perpetuating their exclusion from the
community. It is highly improbable, in fact, that a property owners asso-
ciation would challenge a zoning regulation which effectively excludes low-
and moderate-income people from the community. Nevertheless, allowing
a property owners association to come into court may be the first step
towards granting standing to interest groups of nonresidents.
Only within the past decade has judicial attention focused on the right
of future residents to seek adequate housing withir a given municipality.
To date, this approach has been confined essentially to only two states,
New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 3 where the definition of the general welfare
has been expanded in recent cases to include regional as well as local
needs. Although the question of standing was not at issue in all of the
cases, the courts' emphasis on the regional effects of zoning suggests that
229. The first three factors are taken from Justice Hopkins' concurring opinion at the
Appellate Division. Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 43 App. Div. 2d 739, 740, 350 N.Y.S.2d
708, 711 (1973). The fourth factor was supplied by the Court of Appeals. Douglaston Civic
Ass'n v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 324 N.E.2d 317, 321, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830, 835 (1974).
The rule of standing enunciated in Douglaston has been followed in A.W.A.R.E., Inc. v.
Town of North Hempstead, 367 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975) (civic associa-
tion lacked standing to bring suit for failing to satisfy the criteria set forth by Douglaston).
Douglaston has also been cited in later New York cases, which did not involve civic associa-
tions, as espousing a liberalized standing rule. See Association of Employing Plumbing Con-
tractors v. Gaynor, 48 App. Div. 2d 892, 369 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1975); Sarah Lawrence College v.
City Council, 369 N.Y.S.2d 776 (App. Div. 1975); Manasse v. New York City Health & Hosp.
Corp., 48 App. Div. 2d 804, 369 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1975); Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 75, 324
N.E.2d 536, 365 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1975); Holowka v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 80 Misc. 2d 738,
364 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1975).
230. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was the first state court to recognize the rights of
excluded persons by invalidating local zoning decisions in a series of developer cases. In re
Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); In re Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d
395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). In all three
cases, the developers were found "aggrieved" by denial of a building permit and the subject
ordinance declared invalid. See notes 87-93 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of
these cases.
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future residents also would have standing to attack exclusionary ordi-
nances.
23
'
In two New Jersey cases, excluded residents challenged restrictions in
zoning ordinances concerning future construction of subsidized housing. In
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,'2 3 2 the plaintiffs were
two property-owning developers and six low-income individuals. The latter
represented the class of individuals residing outside of Madison township
who had failed to find housing within the township due to the zoning
restrictions? 3  Although Madison township had some low-income housing,
the number of multifamily units that could have been constructed was
severely limited by the zoning restrictions. The township contended that
it was seeking a balanced community with regard to economic housing.
The court rejected its reasoning and held the ordinance invalid in its en-
tirety. 4
231. In National Land, the court stated that zoning ordinances would be held invalid if
their fundamental goal was the exclusion of new residents to prevent anticipated administra-
tive burdens. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965). To test the validity of a zoning ordinance
as promoting the general welfare, Justice Roberts said that one should initially ascertain
whether public interests rather than purely private interests are being benefited. Id. 215 A.2d
at 611. In Girsh, Justice Roberts stated that "[Nether Providence] must provide for apart-
ments in its plan for future growth; it cannot be allowed to close its doors to others seeking a
'comfortable place to live.'" 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (1970). Subsequently, the court
further admonished in In re Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. that:
[i]t is not for any given township to say who may or may not live within its confines,
while disregarding the interests of th6 entire area. If Concord Township is successful
in unnaturally limiting its population growth through the use of exclusive zoning
regulations, the people who would normally live there will inevitably have to live in
another community, and the requirement that they do so is not a decision that Concord
Township should alone be able to make. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765, 768-69 (1970).
232. 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971).
233. The challenged zoning ordinance restricted (with reference to 30 percent of the vacant,
developable land) the number of multifamily dwellings, the number of bedrooms, the mini-
mum lot size, and the minimum floorspace requirements. The ordinance was amended in
1973 to rectify the situation, but the amended ordinance was subsequently found invalid for
perpetuating an "elite community" of the wealthy. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township
of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223, 227 (1974), on remand from 62 N.J. 185, 299
A.2d 720 (1972).
234. The court stated:
[iun pursuing the valid zoning purpose of a balanced community, a municipality must
not ignore housing needs, that is, its fair proportion of the obligation to meet the
housing needs of its own population and of the region. Housing needs are encompassed
within the general welfare. The general welfare does not stop at each municipal bound-
ary. Large areas of vacant and developable land should not be zoned. . . into such
minimum lot sizes and with such other restrictions that regional as well as local
housing needs are shunted aside. 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353, 358 (1971).
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In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel ,23
there were four classes of plaintiffs, all of whom lived in substandard
housing: (1) present residents of Mount Laurel; (2) former residents of
Mount Laurel who had to move due to the unavailability of suitable hous-
ing; (3) nonresidents in the region who wanted to live in Mount Laurel but
could not afford the housing costs; and (4) organizations representing in-
terests of racial minorities. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief with respect to the township's zoning ordinance and practices.
The demographic effect of Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance was to prevent
the influx of low-income families by keeping the cost of housing prohibi-
tive. With respect to the standing issue, the court indicated that the trial
court was correct in holding that the resident plaintiffs had standing to
bring the action. Although the issue was not raised on appeal, both catego-
ries of nonresident plaintiffs were deemed to have the interests necessary
for standing. With respect to the organizations, no opinion was expressed
as to the standing issue. 1 The zoning ordinance was found to be invalid
as incongruent with the general welfare of the region. 7
While the results of these cases are laudable, it is possible that these
New Jersey decisions may be attributed primarily to that state's liberal
zoning enabling statute."' In any event, due to the autonomous nature of
the respective state court systems, the enlightened approach of two states
will aid only a few of the people seeking low- and moderate-income hous-
ing. 239
235. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), cert. denied 96 S. Ct. 18 (1975).
236. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 717 n.3 (1975) (citations omitted).
237. The court stated that:
lilt is fundamental and not to be forgotten that the zoning power is a police power of
the state and the local authority is acting only as a delegate of that power and is
restricted in* the same manner as is the state. So, when a regulation does have a
substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens beyond the borders of
the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be recognized and served.
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, 726 (1975).
The affirmative action required by Mount Laurel applies to municipalities of "sizeable land
area." Segal Constr. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 134 N.J. Super. 421, 341 A.2d 667
(1975) (Mount Laurel inapplicable to Borough of Wenonah which had land area of scarcely
more than one square mile, of which only 109 acres was undeveloped).
238. N.J. REv. STAT. § 40.55-47.1 (Supp. 1975). Text of this statute is set forth in note 200
supra. But see Walker v. Borough of Stanhope, 23 N.J. 657, 130 A.2d 372 (1957) (retail trailer
home seller granted standing due to economic aggrievement caused by borough ordinance,
even though he was neither a citizen nor taxpayer of borough and was located almost four
miles away).
239. Comment, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv., supra note 192, at 610.
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3. The Virginia Perspective
The Virginia enabling statutes are remarkably similar to the language
of the Standard Act in their provisions for judicial review of zoning deter-
minations. 210 Access to the courts in Virginia is obtained in a variety of
ways.21' To qualify as a "person aggrieved," it is usually necessary to show
injury to some personal interest. 2 Also, "a real interest in the subject
matter in controversy '2  must be demonstrated. These standing require-
ments probably continue to apply despite Virginia's new Administrative
Process Act,24' since it is doubtful that a local planning or zoning commis-
sion would be covered thereunder. 25 However, should either be construed
as an "agency" as defined in the Act, the requirements for judicial review
are arguably more liberal than those in the zoning enabling statutes.246
240. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-497 (Cum. Supp. 1975):
Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the board of
zoning appeals, or any taxpayer or any officer, department, board or bureau of the
county or municipality, may present to the circuit court of the county or city a petition
specifying the grounds on which aggrieved within thirty days after the filing of the
decision in the office of the board. . . .Id.
241. See Note, Land Use Law in Virginia, 9 U. RICH. L. Rav. 513, 539-40 (1975).
242. See, e.g., Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 63, 168 S.E.2d 117, 120 (1969)
("one challenging the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance has the burden of showing
that he himself has been injured or threatened with injury by its enforcement"). Cf. Wilhelm
v. Morgan, 208 Va. 398, 157 S.E.2d 920 (1967); DeFabio v. County School Bd., 199 Va. 511,
100 S.E.2d 760 (1957); County of Fairfax v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9 (1947); Grosso
v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 830, 13 S.E.2d 285 (1941).
243. Abbott v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Va. 820, 823, 108 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1959); accord,
Brinkley v. Blevins, 157 Va. 41, 45, 160 S.E. 23, 24 (1931). These cases were both brought
under declaratory judgment statutes. With respect to Abbott, it has been suggested that the
court decided the case on its merits before concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing.
Gibson, The Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 45 VA. L. REv. 1402, 1451 (1959).
244. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 to -6.14:20 (Cum. Supp. 1975), repealing General
Administrative Agencies Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.1 to -6.14 (1973 Repl. Vol.).
245. By definition, an agency under Virginia's Administrative Process Act is:
[A]ny authority, instrumentality, officer, board, or other unit of the State govern-
ment empowered by the basic laws to make regulations or decide cases but excluding
(iii) municipal corporations, counties, and other local or regional governmental
authorities including sanitary or other districts, and joint State-federal, interstate, or
inter-municipal authorities. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4A(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
246. The relevant statute reads in pertinent part:
Any person affected by and claiming the unlawfulness of any regulation, or party
aggrieved by and claiming unlawfulness of a case decision . .. shall have a right to
the direct review thereof either (i) by proceeding pursuant to express provisions there-
for in the basic law under which the agency acted or (ii), in the absence, inapplicabil-
ity, or inadequacy of such special statutory form of court review proceeding, by an
appropriate and timely court action against the agency as such or its officers or agents
in the manner provided by the rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Id. § 9-6.14:16.
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It appears that contiguous property owners residing both in and outside
of a zoning municipality may qualify as "persons aggrieved." When there
is a proposed zoning amendment reclassifying twenty-five or fewer parcels
of land, written notice is required to be given to
the owner or owners, their agent or the occupant, of each parcel involved, and
to the owners, their agent or the occupant, of all abutting property and
property immediately across the street or road from the property af-
fected. . . . [and] to the owner, their agent or the occupant, of all abutting
property and property immediately across the street from the property af-
fected which lies in an adjoining county or municipality of the Common-
wealth .... 241
It may be inferred that this notice requirement is a statutory recognition
of the potential for these individuals to be "persons aggrieved," assuming
there is some adverse effect to their property as a result of the proposed
zoning determination.
The Virginia Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider the stand-
ing of property owners associations in Belle-Haven Citizens Association v.
Schumann.2 8 A developer had received building permits to construct two
high-rise apartment buildings on the undeveloped twenty-six acres of a
larger tract of land. Appellants, who objected to the issuance of the
permits, were: (1) four taxpayers residing in the vicinity of the land; (2) a
corporation owning land and paying taxes in the subject district; and (3)
two property owners associations, which owned no land but which did pay
annual registration taxes to the state of Virginia. Only the first two catego-
ries of plaintiffs were accorded standing. The court found it unnecessary
to decide whether the associations had standing, since they had been dis-
missed from the case under a decree deciding the merits.2 4 Should the
situation arise again, the Virginia Supreme Court might find the rationale
of the New Yofk court in Douglaston Civic Association v. Galvin20 persu-
247. Id. § 15.1-431.
248. 201 Va. 36, 109 S.E.2d 139 (1959).
249. With respect to the third category, the court said:
The third and final assignment is that the court erred in holding that Belle-Haven
Citizens Association, Incorporated, and Bucknell Manor Citizens Association, Incorpo-
rated, were not proper parties to the cause and dismissing them as parties complain-
ant. This, as the decree states, was on the ground that these two corporations did not
own any real estate and were not aggrieved by the decision of the Board of Zoning
Appeals within the meaning of § 15-850 of the Code. Exception was taken to this ruling
only by these two corporations and since they were dismissed by the decree which
decided the case against their contention on its merits, no prejudice resulted to them
from this ruling. Id. at 42, 109 S.E.2d at 143.
250. 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974). See note 227 supra and accom-
panying text.
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asive. Douglaston and Belle-Haven are factually similar. Nearly identical
statutes were applicable to both, and both came before their respective
courts on similar procedural grounds. On the other hand, the Virginia court
is not likely to take a regional approach in its attitude towards the general
welfare, whereby future residents would be included in the definition of
"parties aggrieved."
In Board of County Supervisors v. Carper,2' an amendment to a Fair-
fax County zoning law which imposed a two-acre minimum lot size re-
striction upon the western two-thirds of the county was struck down for
its exclusionary purpose, which served private rather than public interests
and which bore no relation to the health, safety, morals or general welfare
of the community.2 2 Carper was fundamentally concerned with the depri-
vation of the property rights of the plaintiffs and the exclusionary effects
of the amendment on a county-wide basis.23 The court's language bears
a remarkable resemblance to the general welfare language of the
Pennsylvania court in National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn. 21 How-
ever, the latter case referred to the regional impact as opposed to the intra-
county impact of the challenged zoning ordinance in Carper.
Fourteen years later, the Virginia court cited Carper as authority for
striking down an "inclusionary"' 5 zoning amendment in Board of Supervi-
sors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc. 21 The amendment required developers of
fifty or more dwelling units to commit themselves, before rezoning or site
plan approval, to build at least fifteen percent of the dwelling units as low-
and moderate-income housing with fixed sales and rental ceilings. The
court deemed this to be "socio-economic zoning," 7 and concluded that,
as the legislative intent was neither to include nor exclude socio-economic
groups, it amounted to an unconstitutional taking without just compensa-
tion. This reasoning has been criticized as "unfounded,"' 5 and "patently
absurd." 19
251. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
252. Id. at 661, 107 S.E.2d at 396.
253. Comment, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv., supra note 192, at 605 n.31.
254. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See note 231 supra.
255. Note, Socio-Economic Zoning: One Court's Response, 35 U. Pirr. L. REv. 837, 840
(1974).
256. 214 Va. 235, 238, 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1973). See also the companion case, Board of
Supervisors v. Lukinson, 214 Va. 239, 198 S.E.2d 603 (1973).
257. 214 Va. 235, 238, 198 S.E.2d 600, 602 (1973).
258. Note, 35 U. Pirr. L. REv., supra note 255, at 840.
It may well be true that the Virginia legislature only intended to authorize "physical"
zoning. However, it must be remembered that no matter how "physical" a zoning
ordinance appears to be, it will almost inevitably have social effects. Id. at 841.
259. Burns, Class Struggle in the Suburbs: Exclusionary Zoning Against the Poor, 2
19761
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In Board of Supervisors v. Williams, 20 existing zoning was again found
invalid as applied to the land in question. In dictum, the court said that
the zoning had an exclusionary effect similar to that which had been held
impermissible in Carper.2 6 ' The court made no reference to "socio-
economic zoning" or to DeGroff; however, the court may have desired to
avoid repeating an overstatement of legislative intent, as had been done
in DeGroff.
In conclusion, nonresidents must make strong showings of aggrievement
in order to have standing in Virginia. While it is unclear whether property
owner associations may attack exclusionary ordinances, future residents
are confronted with the Virginia court's policy of considering only the
general welfare of the isolated zoning localities. It has been argued, how-
ever, that a regional concept may be used to grant standing to contiguous
property owners in adjacent municipalities.
IV. CONCLUSION
Substantive constitutional challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances
have been historically unsuccessful, whether based upon due process,
equal protection or right to travel arguments. Courts give such ordinances
only a cursory review to determine whether they serve any rational goal of
the municipality. Although courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey have
begun to apply a more vigorous standard of review, neither the federal
courts nor other state courts appear disposed to follow suit.
The procedural difficulties are no less severe. In order to attain standing
in federal court these challengers must demonstrate some personal injury
resulting from the zoning ordinance's alleged unconstitutionality.
Standing in state courts is based on similar principles with the complain-
ing party required to show damage to a cognizable legal or personal inter-
est.
Although there are minor indications that challengers to exclusionary
zoning are making progress in placing the issues squarely before the courts,
the likelihood of a successful challenge still remains remote.
HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 179, 198 (1975).
Only when a court disapproves of a particular zoning ordinance is the term "socio-
economic" used-as if it indicated a socialist conspiracy. Yet when a court approves
certain zoning, it earns the label of careful planning for the general welfare. Id.
260. 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d 33 (1975).
261. Id. at 58, 216 S.E.2d at 41.
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